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From Parameters, Summer 1999, pp. 57-73.
"Words are the new weapons, satellites the new artillery. . . . Caesar had his officers; Napoleon had his
armies. I have my divisions: TV, news, magazines." -- Archvillain Elliot Carver to James Bond in
Tomorrow Never Dies

While it is true that implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina has proceeded much more
peacefully than many predicted,[1] it is also true that the US peacekeeping forces have maintained vigil over this
Balkan country for much longer than was anticipated or advertised. Since the US commitment to Bosnia is now
acknowledged to be open-ended,[2] it is important to consider how to influence attitudes and emotions in a way that
will allow the ethnic groups in this area to live with one another without a permanent foreign presence guaranteeing
security. There are many methods to change attitudes and shape behavior in Bosnia--economic and military pressure
to name just two. However, not all approaches are as invasive as these two elements of power. A more subtle, certainly
more neglected, but potentially longer-lasting element of power is information.
The principal tool available for the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR)[3] to
influence attitudes in Bosnia has been military psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, and most of the PSYOP
forces accessible to NATO are in the US Army. The contribution of these forces has been laudable, but there have
been many missed opportunities as well as misunderstandings over the last three and a half years regarding what
PSYOP can and cannot do.[4] This article examines the performance of PSYOP forces in Bosnia, offering
recommendations on how to improve this vital part of the US contribution. With US military involvement in Bosnia
planned to continue for some time--and, as this article is being written, with US and NATO forces striking targets in
Serbia and Kosovo--such examination is critically important.
Centralized vs. Decentralized Approaches
Leaders of military PSYOP are finding it difficult to meet the demands of a post-Cold War military increasingly
involved in military operations other than war. Applicable US government policy and PSYOP doctrine reflect a "topdown," centrally controlled, deliberate approach. PSYOP product approval authority is normally delegated by the
geographic Commander-in-Chief (CINC) to the Joint Forces Commander.[5] This arrangement is satisfactory in a
quickly evolving mid- to high-intensity conflict like Desert Storm where the focus is the decisive application of
maneuver and firepower, but in a peacekeeping operation, where tactical commanders need a high degree of local
autonomy in order to be responsive, it creates great difficulties.
Because of the need to support tactical elements as completely as possible, the PSYOP Task Force often expends an
inordinate amount of resources creating, staffing, and producing tactical PSYOP products with limited distribution
instead of focusing upon electronic media, such as radio and television, which can affect the entire theater. As a
consequence, even in this CNN age, PSYOP forces are too focused on the use of the traditional and less-powerful
PSYOP tools of leaflets, loudspeakers, and handbills. As noted by one flag officer in Bosnia, "You [PSYOP] guys still
want to play with your loudspeakers and leaflets all the time and don't realize the power of television. . . . [PSYOP]
should concentrate 90 percent of its effort [in Bosnia] toward television and the rest toward newspapers and radio."[6]
To remain relevant, PSYOP must demonstrably influence audiences in an increasingly sophisticated international
information environment. Under the current doctrinal approach and policy constraints, it is difficult imagining PSYOP

forces becoming the "military CNN" that supported commanders expect. Without a fundamental change in the way
PSYOP forces are permitted to conduct day-to-day functions, they can never co-opt the information cycle of a
sophisticated adversary such as the indigenous media in Bosnia.[7]
PSYOP has a vital role to play in the effective use of military force. This is especially so as the world becomes
increasingly urban and interconnected through the internet and satellite television, media which decrease the likelihood
that US forces can use force against an adversary indiscriminately. PSYOP's role is also magnified as the US military
finds itself more involved in protracted struggles at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. As a US Army study
once noted, "Low-intensity conflict is basically a struggle for people's minds . . . . And in such a battle, psychological
operations are more important than fire power."[8]
A Total Army Force
The US Army PSYOP force structure, with one active component group (roughly the size of a brigade) and two
PSYOP groups in the Army Reserve, reflects an outdated Cold War strategy of force apportionment. Currently, more
than half the PSYOP forces are tactical units with limited ability to plan and produce PSYOP products. Moreover, the
tactical PSYOP soldiers' reliance upon loudspeakers with a range of 1,000 meters is nonsensical in an age where the
effective range of direct fire weapons is nearly five kilometers and the electronic media have overwhelmed all other
forms of communication.
The brains of the PSYOP Task Force is the PSYOP regional battalion.[9] In theory, soldiers in these battalions focus
entirely on their assigned region and are able to deploy rapidly in times of crisis to support the geographic CINC. In
reality, units are often tasked by their home station chain of command to support other theaters as well as perform the
usual administrative taskings. The "area expertise, language, and cultural communicative"[10] skills considered
essential for these PSYOP personnel to be effective are often watered down. Regional PSYOP soldiers often become
generalists lacking an intimate knowledge of the culture and history of the region where they deploy--and even
lacking adequate linguistic skills. Most important, when these troops are stationed at Fort Bragg rather than forward in
the geographic CINC's area of responsibility, the intangible physical and mental links between the supported CINC
and the regional PSYOP battalion are rarely forged before a crisis.
Another organizational impediment for PSYOP is the lack of rank. By doctrine, the PSYOP Task Force is on par with
other Joint Task Force component commanders and should be under the direct operational control of the Joint Forces
Commander.[11] However, the reality is that the limited rank structure in PSYOP often leads to the PSYOP Task Force
being under the command of a lieutenant colonel, or, at best, a colonel. The institutional reluctance to treat a field
grade officer on a par with a flag officer exercising land, air, or sea component command often leads to the
submergence of PSYOP's extraordinary capability under a Joint Task Force staff section. Hence, the direct link that all
agree must exist between a Joint Forces Commander and the PSYOP Task Force if PSYOP is to work effectively is
more often than not interrupted by layers of staff bureaucracy.
These several impediments have hurt the effort in Bosnia.
The Bosnia Propaganda Milieu
For most of its duration, the Bosnian War (1992-95) is best explained as a struggle for perception, with the ground
war a supporting effort. Some have pointed to Bosnia, and the central role of the media, as providing a glimpse of
conflicts in the future.[12] The manipulation of the media by political leaders in the region was central to igniting and
exploiting latent ethnic hatred. In his important work, Forging War, Mark Thompson convincingly outlines the
essential role media orchestration played in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, as Yugoslavia self-destructed.[13] This role
was accentuated in Bosnia. While the Bosnian War occurred in fits and starts, with long periods of desultory peace
punctuated by sharp conflict, the battle of words and perceptions was continuous.[14]

Figure 1. Bosnia-Herzegovina and the surrounding region.

Early in the war, Serb forces made the capture of various radio and television transmitters a high-priority military
objective, seizing control of as much of the local electronic media as possible.[15] The Bosnian-Serb leaders tended to
direct their media message toward the people of former Yugoslavia, not internationally. Generally, they achieved the
desired effect, creating fear and paranoia among Bosnian-Serbs and channeling those emotions into a virulent hatred of
other ethnic groups, while establishing the conviction among Bosnian-Serbs that they were struggling for their very
survival. However, because of the Serb mistrust of the international media and the desire to portray the conflict as
singularly regional (thus to forestall outside intervention), the Serbs made little effort to cater to media representatives
from abroad. When the Serbs did try to take their case to the world, they often handled their "spin" on events in Bosnia
clumsily. This decision to try to insulate themselves from the international media was disastrous for the Serbs.
While the Bosnian-Muslim, or Bosniac, side initially had fewer tools with which to wage media war, they were just as
cognizant, if not more so, of the importance of perception management.[16] Whereas the Serbs channeled their efforts
toward the people of the country, the Bosniacs took great care to influence the international audience. Indeed, they
judged their survival to depend on massive intervention on their behalf by the international community.[17] The
Bosniacs' effort to portray themselves as hapless victims was assisted by the fact that nearly all the international
correspondents assigned to Bosnia stayed in Sarajevo. Because of this concentration of journalists in a city ringed by
besieging Serbs, many succumbed to the "Stockholm Syndrome"--sympathizing too much with the Sarajevans and
losing a measure of journalistic objectivity, as both journalist and Sarajevan suffered through privations caused by the
traumatic siege of the city.[18]
It was in this environment of extremely sophisticated perception management--where the target audience was well
educated, media-savvy, and already the product of more than three years of elaborate propaganda bombardment--that
the US PSYOP effort began.
Initial PSYOP Efforts
The hesitant early PSYOP effort was hampered by three obstacles: the leaders' inability to do an adequate
reconnaissance or local media assessment before December 1995; a lack of facilities and personnel in Sarajevo to
conduct operations; and, most important, a muddled policy with uncertain enforcement. These factors would play

havoc with the ability of the PSYOP Task Force to contribute effectively to the early part of the mission in Bosnia and
lead to the failure of IFOR to persuade the Bosnian-Serbs to remain in the suburbs surrounding Sarajevo.
When the Dayton Peace Agreement was initialed in November 1995, PSYOP was firmly embedded in the planning of
NATO's Allied Forces Southern Command. However, owing to security concerns, until IFOR officially gained control
of the area of operation from the UN forces, key PSYOP personnel were unable to enter Bosnia to conduct the
necessary coordination with local media and to establish appropriate logistical connectivity. Vital local printing and
other media contracts took much longer to put in place than would otherwise have been the case. It was many months
before the PSYOP effort would be able to effectively tap into the ample indigenous print and electronic media
structure.
Another problem was the unexpected movement of the IFOR headquarters from Zagreb, Croatia, to Sarajevo, creating
an immense strain on logistical and administrative facilities. After transfer of authority from the UN to NATO,
Sarajevo was teeming with IFOR soldiers and vehicles, all placing demands on an already marginal support structure.
Originally limited to five personnel, the PSYOP Task Force infiltrated a few soldiers at a time into Sarajevo, escaping
the watchful gaze of the facilities commandant, slowly expanded to 17, and ultimately reached nearly 100 personnel by
June 1996. The associated logistical and administrative issues were immensely challenging, and PSYOP Task Force
leadership often spent much mental and physical energy dealing with nonoperational issues, such as ensuring that
PSYOP soldiers were not tossed from the British-run mess facility or that paper for printing PSYOP products made the
list of priority cargo shipments into the Sarajevo airport. Beyond all of that, the most significant challenge the PSYOP
effort faced was the confused military implementation of the Dayton Agreement.[19]
Notwithstanding these problems, PSYOP radio stations were soon in operation, a weekly PSYOP newspaper in both
the Latinic alphabet (favored by Bosniacs and Bosnian-Croats) and the Cyrillic alphabet (favored by the BosnianSerbs) was in distribution, and tactical PSYOP soldiers, working in the areas of the three ground divisions, were busy
distributing handbills and pamphlets.
The first portion of the PSYOP effort, like that of all of IFOR, was tightly focused on the first few days of the IFOR
mission in Bosnia, almost to the exclusion of looking beyond the first week. Planners at IFOR were apprehensive
about the transfer of authority between UN Protection Forces in Bosnia and IFOR, separating the various factions'
armies, preempting hostile acts against IFOR, and ensuring the Bosnians understood that IFOR had the capability and
will to enforce the Dayton Agreement. All these tasks turned out to be easier than expected. What was not expected
was how contentious the transfer of five Bosnian-Serb suburbs surrounding Sarajevo from control by the Serb political
entity (Republic of Srpska) to the Bosniac-dominated entity (the Federation) would be.[20]
The transfer, originally scheduled to occur all at once on 3 February 1996, was stretched out over 45 days (3 February
to 19 March) for reasons of administrative necessity and security concerns. It was the hope of the Contact Group for
the former Yugoslavia--the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, and France, which sponsored the
settlement at Dayton--to have the Serbs stay in the suburbs. Perhaps naively, the Contact Group representatives and
IFOR wanted to use the occasion as a litmus test of the Dayton assumption that the former warring factions could live
together again. What occurred was an abject failure. The unwillingness of IFOR to guarantee the protection of the
Serbs, the exhortation by the Republic of Srpska government in Pale for the Serbs to move,[21] and the heavy-handed
tactics of Bosniac police in some of the early transferred suburbs made the attempt to stem the tide of departing Serbs
a doomed enterprise.[22] One can argue that the essence of the Dayton Agreement, an integrated, multi-ethnic Bosnian
state, was dealt a damaging blow by this event.
PSYOP played a central role in attempting to get the Serbs to stay. Many thought the Serbs would stay if they simply
knew the details of the transfer plan and were aware of the requirement under the Dayton Agreement for the rights of
all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, to be safeguarded. The failure to convince the Serbs to remain was blamed by some
on "ineffective PSYOP." However, the hollowness of the policy and its hesitant military implementation was the true
culprit. Indeed, the handbills produced by the PSYOP Task Force outlining the transfer process were designed to
encourage Bosnian-Serbs to stay. The Serbs used the information to establish a no-later-than date when they should
depart the suburbs and travel to Republic of Srpska territory.

It was clearly too soon to create and sustain confidence in the more idealistic aspects of the Dayton Agreement. No
decent interval had elapsed to heal the wounds caused by the violence of a long war and the polarization prompted by
media campaigns. Neither ethnic leadership, Bosniac or Serb, viewed keeping the Serbs in the Sarajevo suburbs to be
in their interest. The decision to transfer the territory so quickly after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, coupled
with the unwillingness of IFOR to guarantee the protection of the Serbs, led to their flight. PSYOP's ineffectiveness in
stemming the flow of the Serbs demonstrates that PSYOP is not a panacea and cannot repair inadequate policy.[23]
People will not accept a policy, no matter how well advertised, unless it is credible in their minds and backed by a firm
commitment. Additionally, PSYOP is often a process that may take months if not years. To have expected the PSYOP
Task Force to make any dent in the mistrust between Bosniacs and Serbs by February 1996 was optimistic in the
extreme.
Evolution of Bosnian Policy
By April 1996, NATO's Bosnian policy and IFOR's implementation began to shift, and so did the PSYOP effort. Tasks
allocated to IFOR that would have been termed "mission creep" a few months earlier were now accepted as part of
"mission evolution." Many of the military-related tasks outlined in the Dayton Agreement had been accomplished, but
the civilian task timelines were dangerously behind.[24] NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and NATO military
commander General George Joulwan directed in their D+120 (18 April 1996) instructions that IFOR was to shift gears
and assist the civilian agencies more vigorously--particularly the UN Office of the High Representative, the lead
civilian organization in Bosnia, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the agency
responsible for overseeing the elections in Bosnia.[25]
Accordingly, the PSYOP Task Force developed hundreds of electronic and print media products to support civilian
organizations in Bosnia. For example, PSYOP provided significant assistance to the European Union in supporting the
June 1996 municipal elections in Mostar, a critically important city divided between Bosniacs and Bosnian-Croats in
southwest Bosnia. In the summer of 1996, PSYOP troops were in the forefront of efforts to calm violent Serb crowds
in two incidents outside the Bosnian-Serb army headquarters near Han Pijesak in eastern Bosnia and in helping to
destroy tons of explosives confiscated from the Serbs in an operation called Volcano. PSYOP forces were instrumental
in start-up assistance for the US State Department-sponsored Open Broadcast Network, an alternative daily television
network for the people of Bosnia.[26] OSCE's chief in Bosnia, Ambassador Robert Frowick, credited IFOR, including
PSYOP (then known as the IFOR Information Campaign), with helping to ensure successful national elections in
1996.[27] Early polls in Bosnia sponsored by the US Information Agency indicated that the PSYOP message was
getting out;[28] the Russians also were taking note of the US PSYOP effort and gave it high marks.[29]
The announcement that the NATO mission in Bosnia would continue beyond the original December 1996 deadline did
not occur until after the US presidential election in November 1996. As a result, the official planning at the Heidelberg
headquarters of NATO's Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), the successor to Allied Forces Southern Europe
for the Bosnia mission, had presupposed withdrawal of all IFOR troops. This led to difficult questions from the press
in Sarajevo, who asked why the controlling headquarters would be changed merely to execute a withdrawal. Even the
words "follow-on force" were verboten at LANDCENT headquarters and in Sarajevo. Some planning for a
continuation of the Bosnia mission after December 1996 was done, but it was limited. Perhaps no part of IFOR
suffered more under these policy restrictions than the PSYOP effort, which of course had to parrot the party line
throughout Bosnia that IFOR would soon withdraw and the people of the region would have to fend for themselves. It
was a scenario the people of Bosnia did not believe, and it ultimately proved to be false. The credibility of the PSYOP
effort and IFOR/SFOR was harmed as a result.
PSYOP's Lack of Responsiveness to Tactical Commanders
Another significant challenge faced by PSYOP in Bosnia was a misperception regarding PSYOP's capabilities,
especially at the tactical level. PSYOP is a powerful tool. However, because of the constraints of policy and doctrine
outlined earlier, PSYOP is less flexible and responsive at the tactical level. That frustrates tactical commanders, and it
did those in Bosnia.
Ground tactical control of Bosnia is divided into three multinational zones. The United States, the United Kingdom,

and France each provide the command and control of a multinational division. Each division has handled PSYOP
differently, yet a common refrain has been the frustration with PSYOP's lack of responsiveness and flexibility at the
tactical level.

Figure 2. Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Multinational Division boundaries.

Multinational Division Southeast, under the control of the French, originally kept PSYOP at arm's length. The French
reluctance to incorporate PSYOP into their plans was largely a legacy of their remembrance of French PSYOP's
dubious role in the war in Algeria in the late 1950s and early 1960s and participation in the attempted coup against
Charles de Gaulle in 1961.[30] The French also seemed to mistrust the motives of the US PSYOP personnel, who
dominated the early effort in Bosnia. Over time, the French began to accept increased US PSYOP support, including a
PSYOP radio station in Mostar and a small group of US tactical PSYOP soldiers who disseminated materials. The
French frustration with the Byzantine nature of the US/NATO PSYOP product approval process contributed to their
desire to develop their own capability in order to influence the PSYOP context more directly. This led to the
establishment of a French-run PSYOP radio station and creation of a French/Spanish/German PSYOP print product
development capability in Mostar, all with virtually no oversight from the PSYOP Task Force headquarters in
Sarajevo.
By contrast, in the Multinational Division Southwest area, controlled by the United Kingdom, the importance of
PSYOP was recognized early. The UK military, drawing upon its extensive experience in Northern Ireland as well as
its intimate familiarity with the region as part of the UN Protection Force, knew the critical importance of the battle for
Bosnian "hearts and minds." Thus they requested deployment of US tactical PSYOP soldiers and radio broadcast
equipment. However, as with the French-led division, dissatisfaction with slow product support and a desire to control
its own product development processes led the UK to field its own PSYOP element at its headquarters in Banja Luka.
This element continued to disseminate some products made by the PSYOP Task Force headquarters in Sarajevo, but
the emphasis in the region was centered on its own PSYOP magazine, handbills, and other materials produced in Banja
Luka. Once again, oversight from Sarajevo was limited.

Meanwhile, in the US-led Multinational Division North, US PSYOP support, as one would expect, was robust from
the beginning. The dominant mentality in this sector was not to change hearts and minds, however, but to protect the
US force, almost to the exclusion of any other facet of mission accomplishment. Division Southwest, with the fewest
soldiers of any division in Bosnia, vigorously patrolled its area from 20 December 1995 and immediately set a new
tone to distinguish IFOR from the UN Protection Force. The US forces, by contrast, arguably operating in the least
hostile area initially, but deploying the most firepower, hunkered down in their bases and moved tentatively about the
countryside.[31] Some at IFOR headquarters attributed several incidents with the local populace in the US sector to the
overly aggressive posture of the forces. Over time, the command group in Division North recognized the importance
of PSYOP, and at its height the PSYOP effort included more than 40 tactical PSYOP soldiers, radio transmitters in
both Tuzla and Brcko, a radio studio in Brcko built by Division North for live broadcasts, and a large PSYOP planning
staff in Tuzla with a lieutenant colonel in charge.[32]
Yet this extraordinary level of support did not satisfy a succession of Division North commanders. The issue causing
the most consternation was, and still is, the requirement in US/NATO policy and doctrine for the centralized planning
and decentralized execution of PSYOP.[33] Eventually, personnel from the newly formed Land Information Warfare
Activity (LIWA) were summoned to assist in planning and coordinating the overall information operations effort in the
US-led area. Although LIWA's efforts were welcome, it was clear that LIWA personnel understood little about the
policy implications of developing PSYOP objectives and themes at the division level.[34] Additionally, LIWA staff
planners were nearly always senior in rank to the top PSYOP officer at the division headquarters. Therefore, even
though LIWA's charter was to act as a coordinating conduit, in Division North it often became the de facto director of
the PSYOP effort. Eventually the Division North PSYOP effort became as independent as the ones in the French and
UK sectors. For example, in October 1997, PSYOP leaflets were unilaterally developed, produced, and distributed by
helicopter in the US sector.[35]
Because of the nature of the mission and the considerable freedom exercised by division commanders in Bosnia,
PSYOP was stretched to the breaking point at the tactical level. Division commanders knew the PSYOP forces were
prime contributors to their success and strove to control PSYOP product development, production, and dissemination
in their areas of responsibility. Even though both US and NATO PSYOP doctrine and policy place constraints on this
type of decentralized action, as time passed each division formed its own PSYOP capability and began to execute its
own PSYOP plan, often with little if any oversight by the PSYOP Task Force in Sarajevo.
PSYOP's Access to Senior Commanders
Until October 1996, command and control of theater-level PSYOP in Bosnia was handled jointly by the IFOR and the
Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps command groups. US Navy Admiral Leighton Smith (IFOR
Commander until July 1996) delegated much of the day-to-day PSYOP approval authority to his Land Component
Commander, UK Lieutenant General Sir Michael Walker. Walker became the approving authority for all tactical
PSYOP products (loudspeaker messages, handbills, etc.). Those operational PSYOP products disseminated
simultaneously throughout the entire country (PSYOP newspaper, radio, and television) were approved first by the
ACE Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters and then by the IFOR command group (with final approval by the IFOR
Chief of Staff, US Lieutenant General William Carter).
Lieutenant General Walker was a godsend for the early PSYOP campaign. Articulate, accessible, and fully cognizant
of the importance of PSYOP in Bosnia, he provided very skilled direction.[36] He placed the coordination of the public
affairs and PSYOP efforts in the hands of his corps field artillery commander, who was able to provide the needed
coordination between all the information operation assets while avoiding the temptation to exert command and control.
Nearly every morning Walker chaired an Information Coordination Group meeting with the deputy commander, his
information operations coordinator, a G3 (operations) representative, a G2 (intelligence) representative, the public
affairs officer, a civil affairs representative, the legal advisor, the political advisor, and a PSYOP representative. In
these 15- to 20-minute meetings, the participants discussed short-term information operations actions (primarily
PSYOP and public affairs), and Walker issued guidance on what "spin" to use. In addition, a weekly "perception
group" meeting (led by the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps) and a Joint Information Coordination Committee meeting (led
by IFOR) were held to coordinate long-term information operations planning.

The transition of the IFOR mission to the LANDCENT in late 1996 drastically changed the fashion in which PSYOP
was perceived and used at the theater level. In contrast to officers at both Allied Forces Southern Europe and ACE
Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters who had studied the Bosnian situation for years in preparation for contingency
missions, LANDCENT personnel were not nearly as familiar with the area of operation. Additionally, the importance
of PSYOP was not evident in their preparations; LANDCENT did not even have an assigned PSYOP staff member
while planning its transition into the Bosnia mission.
In an attempt to streamline the chain of command, LANDCENT eliminated the role of the land component
headquarters, previously filled by the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps under IFOR. The commander of the successor to
IFOR, NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR), became both the Combined/Joint Forces Commander and Land
Component Commander, but gave the day-to-day task of running the land operations to a Deputy Chief-of-Staff. This
inhibited the PSYOP effort. First, the new arrangement gave even more autonomy to the division commanders. The
ability to centrally plan and coordinate PSYOP activities in Bosnia, difficult to begin with, was now nearly impossible.
The SFOR Commander was busy with theater-wide affairs, and the Deputy Chief-of-Staff for Land Operations did not
have direct command and control of the divisions.
Second, few in a position of command authority at SFOR headquarters took the time to conduct conclusive
information operations meetings every day as had Lieutenant General Walker.[37] The PSYOP Task Force, now
working largely as a staff section under the guidance of the operations directorate of SFOR, was clearly diminished in
importance. Under IFOR, a PSYOP representative met with the Land Component Commander daily; under SFOR, the
PSYOP Task Force commander rarely met with the Deputy Chief-of-Staff for Land Operations, much less the SFOR
Commander.
Third, perhaps because of LANDCENT's unfamiliarity with PSYOP and the area of operations, approval bottlenecks
for PSYOP products were created, making timeliness of PSYOP products even more problematic. A downward spiral
was now in place. Because of a seeming mistrust of PSYOP, LANDCENT placed it under more restrictions, making
PSYOP even less responsive, which served to deepen the mistrust.
This spiral reached its inevitable nadir in the summer of 1997. During an internal political power struggle in Republic
of Srpska, SFOR attempted to capture two secretly indicted Bosnian-Serb war criminals near Prijedor on 10 July 1997.
Tragically, the PSYOP Task Force, buried in the operations section and out of earshot of the SFOR command group,
was not brought into the planning process until the last minute. Consequently, the PSYOP Task Force found itself
constantly responding to disinformation coming from the Republic of Srpska radio and television outlets regarding
both the war criminal operation and the internal power struggle. The PSYOP Task Force was never able to reverse the
negative spin created by the Bosnian-Serb media. For LANDCENT, already unfamiliar with and suspicious of
PSYOP, the events of the summer of 1997 caused a serious crisis of confidence in the PSYOP Task Force.[38] As a
result, attempts were made to bolster PSYOP capabilities at the theater level. Still, the most critical issue--for the
PSYOP Task Force commander to have regular access to the SFOR Commander--was neglected.
To be fair, some lessons were learned from the events of the summer, and the PSYOP Task Force was an early and
critical participant in another SFOR operation on 18 December 1997 to capture two indicted Bosnian-Croats. This time
SFOR was prepared, making sure its version regarding the capture was told first and often, preempting the BosnianCroat media spinmeisters.[39] Still, the relegation of PSYOP to that of a subordinate staff component within the
operations directorate ensured that the SFOR Commander's messages to the Bosnian people would usually be
untimely, filtered, and diluted by various intermediaries in the SFOR headquarters.
Recommendations
From its low point in the summer of 1997, the PSYOP Task Force in Bosnia managed to regain some credibility, even
receiving favorable press attention.[40] To increase its competitiveness with local media and reduce military
manpower requirements, the PSYOP Task Force contracted for the services of a popular and respected Bosnian
political cartoonist and began to feature the footage of local videographers in its news programs.[41]
During 1998 and the first few months of 1999, the PSYOP effort in Bosnia followed a routine of business as usual,

punctuated by the occasional surge caused either by an election, capture of an indicted war criminal, or other
spectacular event. The PSYOP Task Force had its first non-US commander when a Bundeswehr officer commanded
the PSYOP Task Force from July 1998 until February 1999. While SFOR's command structure has changed, the
PSYOP Task Force is still several layers removed from the SFOR Commander; it is now part of a staff section under
control of the assistant chief of staff for civilian operations. Unfettered access to the SFOR Commander remains as
elusive as ever.
It is clear that much work needs to be done to make PSYOP more effective. The US Army and NATO will be in
Bosnia at least several more years. Many will judge PSYOP's future role in the military by its Bosnian performance.
Consequently, while some in the PSYOP community may want to get rid of the Bosnian bugbear as quickly as
possible, it is better to embrace the Bosnian challenge and test whether it is truly possible for PSYOP to operate
effectively in the information age. Lessons learned thus far from the PSYOP experience in Bosnia include the
following.[42]

. The PSYOP Task Force commander must have full and continual access to the Joint Task Force command group.
Much as the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps commander did in Bosnia, a key member of the SFOR command group,
certainly no lower than chief of staff and preferably the commander, should chair daily meetings to coordinate the
efforts of all the information operations assets and determine that day's media spin on events.

. Commanders at all levels should be thoroughly educated regarding the media environment in prospective areas of
operation. The capabilities (and constraints) of PSYOP should be a featured course segment at senior service colleges
and in flag officer preparation courses. De-mystify PSYOP, making clear it is neither a black art, nor, as confirmed in
the Serb suburbs of Sarajevo, a savior for an ill-conceived mission. Clearly delineate what is within the tactical unit's
domain to do in terms of PSYOP products and dissemination. Loosen PSYOP policy and doctrine when operating in
low-intensity conflicts, giving tactical commanders the latitude to conduct their own PSYOP plan, within given
constraints. Theater-level PSYOP must remain the prerogative of the Joint Forces Commander or geographic CINC.

. We should consider assigning regional PSYOP battalions to the standing forces of the geographic CINCs and
position them accordingly--away from Fort Bragg. Beef up the PSYOP staff planning sections at all levels and
contemplate the creation of a PSYOP advisor position (perhaps a civilian) on the geographic CINC's special staff.

. The rank structure in PSYOP forces should be elevated to avoid the tendency to treat PSYOP Task Force
commanders, who are by joint and Army doctrine component commanders, as staff officers. Focus the resources and
energies of existing PSYOP forces on electronic media, particularly television. Allow for the early entry of PSYOP
planners into the theater of operations. Consider these forces "theater enablers" and ensure their access to the local and
military support structures so they can contribute to the mission as quickly and effectively as possible.
While the Bosnian operation will continue for some time, the sooner the PSYOP effort can assist in moderating
ingrained hyper-nationalistic attitudes in the country, the sooner NATO and the United States will achieve the desired
end state and can safely scale down their commitments without fear of a new war starting. The United States, NATO,
and SFOR need to make a PSYOP investment in Bosnia in terms of both the money and the importance it is allocated-that means not just equipment upgrades but more time with and greater access to the SFOR Commander. The PSYOP
effort in Bosnia must be capable of playing at a major-league level in order to be successful, but it needs help to get
there. When viewed against the totality of the international effort in Bosnia, the increased contribution required to
bolster the PSYOP effort would be small indeed.
If we look beyond Bosnia and the media environment in the former Yugoslavia, it is almost a certainty the US military
can expect to continue to operate in environments where sophisticated indigenous media, with robust capabilities, will
attempt to achieve information dominance to the detriment of US mission accomplishment. If the US military PSYOP
force is unable to operate in this environment and effectively neutralize the negative effects of the local media, its
methods and continued existence should be questioned. Bosnia is the testing ground to see if US PSYOP can operate
capably in a 21st-century media environment. For the people of Bosnia, and for the US military, a great deal hangs in

the balance.
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